In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Storia dei filosofi: La stoà da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. 1018), Edizione, traduzione e commentoDiskin ClayDorandi, Tiziano, ed. Filodemo Storia dei filosofi: La stoà da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. 1018), Edizione, traduzione e commento. Leiden, New York, and Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1994. xvi 1 189 pp. Cloth, Gld. 110.00, $63 (U.S.) (Philosophia Antiqua, 60)The title of this edition of Philodemus is Storia dei filosofi. It translates a (...) more perplexing and tantalizing title in Greek. This is not preserved in the subscription to the Herculaneum papyrus edited here (PHerc. 1018). In the Catologo dei Papiri Ercolanesi (Bibliopolis: Naples 1979) the title of this treatise is given as [Filodümoy | Perç t©n ½p̄ Zünvnoq Stvik©n kaç ađrª | sevn ápŒntvn | q ]t [¼ ]x [oi..... ] | Sy [ntŒjevq t©n filos¿fvn | b¼bloq ]. This is approximately the title Agosto Traversa gave the work in his edition, Index Stoicorum Herculanensis (Genoa 1952). The reader will appreciate how ambitious Traversa’s supplements are. The inspiration for his title comes from the title Domenico Comparetti gave its companion work, PHerc. 1021 (1164), Filodümoy S′ntajiq [End Page 146] filos¿fvn. Comparetti’s inspiration was the notice in Diogenes Laertius, who cites the tenth book of Philodemus’ ï t©n filos¿fvn s′ntajiq (10.3). This second history of a philosophical school has long been known under the title that S. Mekler chose for it at the beginning of this century, Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculanensis (Berlin 1902). The fact is that the word s′ntajiq occurs in neither of Philodemus’ companion treatises on the history of the Academic and Stoic philosophers.In both treatises and in PHerc. 1021 especially, Philodemus is generous with dates. He writes the nearly parallel histories of these schools from their foundation by Plato and Zeno of Citium down to his own day. Philodemus dates are not certain. Ca. 110–40 b.c.e. are the dates commonly given. Only a few lines are missing from the protected innermost midollo of PHerc. 1021, and the text of the last columns makes it clear that Philodemus has taken his history of the Academy down to his own day, not that of his master in Athens, Zeno of Sidon. He speaks of Menekrates of Mytilene (a student of Antiochus of Ascalon) as resident in Sicily “until recently” (24, 8–11) and of students of Antiochus who are “our acquaintances” (35, 5–8). The last words of the papyrus are: “[of the sects and successions beginning with Eucleides and those beginning with Plato, and the other sects and successions that came after these a collection....” The word which comes closest to giving us a title for these histories of Philodemus is syna [gvgü (col. 36, 19). If these two treatises belong to the work entitled “The Ordering of the Philosophers” it is plain that Philodemus’ inspiration is Apollodoros of Athens’ vast Xronikî s′ntajiq, which Philodemus made great use of in his Academicorum Historia and which he uses sparingly in his Stoicorum Historia. (He is named as Apollodoros “the man of letters”—¸ grammatik¿q —at the end of Philodemus’ Stoicorum Historia, col. 69. 4–5.)In lack of a title in the subscription to PHerc. 1018, Dorandi’s Storia dei filosofi is as good description as any. Philodemus is interested in the succession, lives, and characters of the Stoics whose history he writes—not their philosophy. A review of Dorandi’s Stoicorum Historia should offer a brief review of the companion edition of Philodemus’ history of the Academic philosophers that preceded it, for it seems clear from the end of PHerc. 1021 that Philodemus’ history of the Academic philosophers came first. Dorandi published Filodemo · Storia dei filosofi: Platone e l’Academia (PHerc. 1021 e 164) as volume 12 of Marcello Gigante’s La Scuola di Epicuro (Bibliopolis: Naples, 1991). The format of both volumes is strikingly similar: both contain introductions to Philodemus as a historian, first of the Academy and then of the Stoa; both give a survey of Philodemus’ sources in writing his histories. In both volumes a description of the papyri edited precedes Dorandi’s scrupulous and exacting editions of... (shrink)

In seeking to understand the development of philosophy in later antiquity it is important to take account of Clement of Alexandria, perhaps the first Christian writer to be greatly influenced by the systems of Greece. Accordingly in this article certain aspects of Clement's doctrine will be selected for examination where his obligations to the philosophers have apparently hitherto received insufficient attention. In a valuable paper Mr. R. P. Casey has dealt with many important points, but there is room for further (...) exploration, both by the philological method and by a careful comparison of corresponding ideas in Clement and Plotinus. I am here concerned to stress resemblances rather than to prove, for instance, that any direct connection exists between Neoplatonism and Alexandrian theology. It is nevertheless not irrevelant to mention that Ammonius Saccas, the professor whose lectures both Origen the Christian and Plotinus were to attend, and who, besides being a Platonist, if not the founder of Neoplatonism, was also an apostate Christian, had probably begun to attract attention in Alexandria at the time when Clement was head of the Christian School there, in which perhaps Ammonius himself had been originally educated. There seems nothing to prevent the assumption that Ammonius and Clement were known at least by name to each other, and perhaps the philosopher under whom Plotinus was to study for eleven years had even sat by the side of Clement at the feet of Pantaenus, the erstwhile Stoic and founder of the Catechetical School. However that may be, both Neoplatonism and Alexandrian theology show a markedly similar tendency, and in the Enneads and the Stromateis there are many equivalent features. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

In later antiquity few monuments at Athens had such a great reputation as what the Athenians called with pride the Altar of Eleos or Pity, the suppliants' altar. Philostratos links it in fame with Olympia and Delphi. The Athenians pay homage to Eleos along with Athena Polias, says Sopatros. ‘You have an Altar of Eleos’, says Apsines to the Athenians; ‘…for this you have a great reputation amongst all other men.’.

The Islamic Medieval Philosopher al-Ghazᾱlî, known to the Latins as Algazel, was influential in the shaping of the intellectual philosophic movements in the thirteenth century. Though Ghazali’s predecessor Ibn Sînᾱ and successor Ibn Rushd received the philosophic credit due to them, Ghazali’s own philosophic ideas have not been significantly assessed; and hence Ghazali’s “fame” lies, we are told, in being responsible for the decline of Medieval Philosophy, especially Islamic Philosophy, a claim that is extremely difficult to prove. But be that (...) as it may, the intellectual movement in Europe during the thirteenth century pursued the intellectual Islamic heritage, not just of Avicenna and Averroës, but also that of Ghazali. Granted that Ghazali’s philosophic ideas did not assume a definite pattern in the philosophic literature—as was the case with Avicenna and Averroës—still a careful study of Ghazali’s works will reveal how profound and widespread his influence was on Western Medieval scholars. A case in point is the influence of Ghazali on Saint Thomas Aquinas—who studied the works of the Islamic philosophers, especially Ghazali’s, at The University of Naples. Thus in the course of the subsequent analysis, similarities between Ghazali and Aquinas will reveal themselves. The aim of this paper, however, does not consist in delineating their refutations of the arguments of the philosophers that one finds in Ghazali’s and Aquinas’s works. Rather I shall primarily deal with their discussion of the principle of causality and then indicate how the works of Ghazali have played an important role in the shaping of the philosophic ideas of Aquinas. (shrink)

R. E. Heinaman; XI*—Communion of Forms, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 175–190, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

This study represents an improvement in the ethics scales inventory published in a 1988 Journal of Business Ethics article. The article presents the distillation and validation process whereby the original 33 item inventory was reduced to eight items. These eight items comprise the following ethical dimensions: a moral equity dimension, a relativism dimension, and a contractualism dimension. The multidimensional ethics scale demonstrates significant predictive ability.

It is argued that a radical relocation of subjectivity began several thousand years ago. A subjectivity experienced in the centric region of the heart, and in the body as a whole, began to be avoided in favor of the eccentric head as a new location of subjectivity. In ancient literature, for example in Homer's epics, the heart and various other bodily organs were described as centers of subjectivity and organs of perception for spiritual experience and communion with others and the (...) world. Mind and body were integrated. Bur also in the early historical record, as in the Old Testament, the heart and body were increasingly described as rebellious and rejected as impure. Head and heart, mind and body, became estranged. The body was judged an unsuitable, impure vessel for spiritual experience. This change in the location of subjectivity presaged the later development of Platonic, Gnostic, Christian, and Cartesian distinctions favoring mind over and against the body. It may also have contributed to some of the characteristic psychological and pathological processes (e.g., psychosomatic illnesses, repression, narcissism) currently attributed to the psychology of the modern Western, and specifically, North American self. (shrink)

In his very interesting book The Grounds of Moral Judgement, Dr. G. R. Grice tries to reconstitute contract theory so as to give an account of morality such that moral requirements can be explained in terms of what he calls the contract ground. He wants to go on and argue from this that it is irrational to be immoral, but my concern lies immediately with the contract ground. I think that faults can be found in the setting up of the (...) contract ground, which is the core of Grice's theory. (shrink)

The object of this article is to set forth certain evidence that emerges from a study of three of Plutarch's Lives, the Titus, the Paullus, and the Cato Maior, evidence which indicates that these Lives are based upon a definite type of biographical composition, and to suggest its possible origin and date. Since E. Meyer's article on the Cimon of Nepos and Plutarch, biographical sources have generally been assumed for the Greek Lives, and there has been a tendency to make (...) the same assumption for the Roman Lives also, without, however, setting forth the evidence that might justify it. Uxkull Gyllenband maintained that biographies of Greeks and Romans, the sources of Plutarch, were written in the second century b.c., but he gives no evidence for his contention, which is indeed refuted by the observations of Jacoby. Mühl argued with some force that Plutarch's source for the Marcellus was a biography. There is good reason to doubt his conclusion that Plutarch has used a biography of Poseidonius; but the arguments advanced by Klotz for the thesis that the source was the annalist Valerius Antias are still less convincing. Liedmeier postulates a biographical source for the Paullus, but without doing more than asserting the general improbability that Plutarch here used a multiplicity of sources. It seems therefore desirable to collect such evidence as there is of a biographical source in these three Roman Lives of the second century b.c., and it is with such an attempt rather than with a priori considerations that I am here concerned. (shrink)

Recent authors have raised objections to the counterfactual interpretation of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule of time-symmetrised quantum theory. I distinguish between two different readings of the ABL rule, counterfactual and non-counterfactual, and confirm that TSQT advocate L. Vaidman is employing the counterfactual reading to which these authors object. Vaidman has responded to the objections by proposing a new kind of time-symmetrised counterfactual, which he has defined in two different ways. It is argued that neither definition succeeds in overcoming the objections, except (...) in a limited special case previously noted by Cohen and Hiley. In addition, a connection is made between TSQT and Price's concept of 'advanced action', which further supports the special case discussed. (shrink)

Roman Catholic bioethics seems to be caught in a paradox. One the one hand it is committed to the natural law tradition and the power of reason to understand the structures of creation and the moral law. On the other hand there is a greater and greater appeal to Scripture and revelation. The tradition maintains that reason is capable of understanding the rational structures of reality and that ethics is properly built on metaphysics. In this way ethics, bioethics, is non-sectarian. (...) However, the tradition also recognizes the effects of Original Sin on the will and intellect and the broad cultural changes that have affected our understanding of metaphysics. The appeal to Revelation is a corrective to many contemporary trends in ethics and bioethics. This article will examine the interplay of reason and revelation in the Church's teaching on sexuality, (particularly contraception and in vitro fertilization), suffering, and death. Catholic bioethics is in the end prophetic and ecumenical and not gnostic and non-ecumenical. (shrink)